Direct Current Leadership: No Alternative to Power

In most countries, the primary occupation and preoccupation of the leader is staying in power. Although international political and diplomatic discourse—and much media reporting– is predicated on the notion that rulers act on the basis of law, for the good of their nations, or with a strategic interest in some defined long-term benefit, rulers’ actions consistently prove these presumptions wrong. It is a strain of myopia to believe or pretend that most rulers in the world care about anything but continuing to rule.

Government officials and pundits in rich democracies often express surprise, disappointment, or even hurt feelings when, to use one common example, the ruler of a country that is not a rich democracy makes clear that, despite the laws or constitution that prohibit staying in office beyond his current mandate, he does not plan to leave his post. (NB: Because the overwhelming majority of such rulers are men, this article will depart from standard usage and use masculine pronouns.) Observers and international partners may also evince naive astonishment or shock when he uses his office for personal financial gain, to create opportunities for relatives or friends, or to menace and/or harm anyone who challenges his grip on power.

Yet this behavior is, of course, to be expected; it is the modus operandi in the overwhelming majority of countries. Most world leaders’ governing goals or principles amount to nothing more than remaining in power as long as possible.  This is human nature, but these men’s obsession with occupying the top spot is, in general, also prudent and reasonable behavior. After all, most nations’ political systems and societies do not offer former leaders roles or niches that provide financial security, worthy outlets for their experience and energy, and– perhaps most important—the honor and respect they believe they have earned. Most rulers are thus– quite understandably— comfortable where they are and determined to stay there.

The importance the ruler places on remaining in office over any other priority is sometimes demonstrated by actions that twist or abandon his prior goals or aspirations. On many occasions, a country’s leader does something counterintuitive or unorthodox that momentarily astounds precisely because it doesn’t seem to fit a narrative or context that had defined his previously expressed identity or deliberate actions. (Former Yemeni president Saleh’s alliance with the Houthis is a good example.) Every single time this kind of thing happens, the leader is making the unusual decision or taking the unexpected step for the simple reason that he believes it’s good for him. He is never loyal to a party, ideology, set of laws, current allies, or his people. He is certainly not to be constrained by commonly-understood concepts of right and wrong. What is right is remaining in power. That’s all there is to it.

Examples of this abound. Scan the international news any day to find reminders or new occurrences of the by-now-standard artifices even elected leaders employ to remain in office. Just a few of the more common tactics are constitutional changes to allow extra terms in office, sliding into the office of prime minister from the presidency (or vice-versa) with attendant shifts of duties from the old office to the new, sudden alliances with former political enemies to maintain or retake power, and imposition by decree of “temporary emergency” measures which delay political processes and—literally—handcuff the opposition.

Yet the international community quite often pretends that these rulers and their systems of government stand for something other than holding onto power. Governments, media, and knowledgeable observers often express something like dismay when these leaders “forget,” ‘’neglect,” “fail to respect,” or even “betray” some presumably universal ideal. They aren’t. They have one ideal, and they admire it in the mirror. That is the fairest representation of all ideologies, policies, or philosophies.

And none of this should be a surprise, since the factors that help generate these realities are usually related to size and scale. Most countries in the world offer much less to exploit and much less to control than large developed democracies, so leaders’ ability to control and exploit what’s available in most countries is easily and quickly magnified.  Even without resorting to violent oppression, there are many subtle but effective ways for a leader to ensure that his writ runs far and wide. (For the purposes of this essay, the leader’s effective control of security forces is assumed.)

Establishing control of a small country’s few banks or sources of credit creates stifling economic and political power. If one main port and airport serve the country, seizing the administration of those utilities confers significant leverage that translates into commercial, security, and fiscal advantages. Relatively new but increasingly important slices of power that most leaders hasten to carve out for themselves are cell phone networks, TV stations, and soccer/football teams (the latter being the true religion or faith of the majority of males in most countries). If a political leader gains enough influence—directly or through proxies—of these components of national economic and social identity, everyone else who matters will in some way come to depend on that leader. And that leader will have no incentive or impetus to relinquish his position.

Second, while all societies and countries have at least some diffuse elements of traditional power, most formal political systems are quite centralized—certainly compared to the example of the United States. In most countries, being the ruler means controlling the capital city; in most countries the capital city controls almost everything else. In contrast, the governor of any given U.S. state arguably has greater authority over the day-to-day lives of that state’s citizens than the U.S. president or Congress do. The local county or municipality government might even have more influence over Americans’ quotidian activities than their state government. It is thus difficult to establish a great deal of political control over the American population. Yet, in most countries, the national government controls the university system, owns and operates public utilities, and runs at least some TV networks and other media. Even many sports teams are sponsored by the police or army or some other state or parastatal institution. Consolidating control over a centralized system offers exponentially more power to a ruler than he might aspire to in a federal or less centralized political landscape. This scenario, of course, also underscores the role of the national leader and makes it that much more difficult to dislodge him or those close to him.

Related to this, in countries that once had regional or local sources of political power—perhaps through elected governors, for example—it is not uncommon to see a leader seek new ways to eliminate those poles of authority.  A tried and true method is engineering the transition—usually with a façade of legality—from a system of elected governors and/or municipal chiefs to a system in which those subnational officials are appointed by the ruler himself. A ruler who successfully appoints regional authorities can also usually command the loyalty of those political and economic agents who depend on those regional authorities. They, too, are now tied to the ruler through their superior/ benefactor and would likely be replaced should the ruler pick someone else. In a small economy, this type of expanded web of patronage extends as far as school principals, factory shift bosses, the heads of local radio stations, and many other positions of relatively small-scale authority.

Most nations are, therefore, ruled by someone—regardless of how he came to power—who has amassed most of the levers of power and jealously keeps them at his disposal. The national budget, access to credit, opportunities for employment or contracts, identification with elements of national identity (sports teams, for example) are just some of the arrows in the quiver of authority controlled or strongly influenced by one person and his close entourage.

While in office, of course, a leader’s primary activity is to employ the prerogatives of power to favor and enrich himself and those who are close to him. Everyone in the country he governs understands this in the same way that he does. Sometimes, Western governments and media appear to be the only ones who don’t appear to grasp this basic concept.

In the end, however, the leader’s abiding aspiration is rarely just financial gain. It is perhaps more important that the leader also corner the market on honor and respect. Due to his many tentacles and influence, respecting and deferring to him as a matter of course is not only judicious, but likely inevitable. Over time, however, admiration and respect for him might be genuine– and earned. After all, the media the leader controls extol his proclaimed authorship of any measurable progress or glory and highlight his shining participation in almost every event of importance to and in the country. Over time, the leader becomes so closely identified with the nation that he begins to believe that he is the primary ingredient in anything of note that occurs in the country.

In this context, what is a leader to do when her or his time is up? At a certain point, it becomes inconceivable to him to leave power. Why should he? He rationalizes that nothing would work properly without him. Surely, the people have become dependent on his dedication, effort, and very persona, he imagines. Worse, what if someone else controlled all these tools of power he has worked so hard to amass and guard? In short: What would happen to him and to those he cares about—to say nothing of the many who owe their fortunes and lot in life to their association with him? This is too grim a prospect to imagine, so there is no point in entertaining the notion of leaving power.

Of course, the desire to remain in office is fairly universal. Even in rich, large democracies many leaders value their own power above all else. Why would someone seek public office, after all, if s/he didn’t believe s/he was better than the alternatives? If s/he is better, why should s/he leave? There is no shortage of Western politicians who stay as long as they can and muse about staying longer when they eventually, grudgingly, give up their office.

However, several traditional factors in rich democracies mitigate the worst instincts of their leaders to remain in power indefinitely, and some of them do not depend on the rule of law or a functioning system of separation of powers.

First, the sheer size of the U.S. and a few other large countries is complemented by a resultant decentralization of political and economic power. People who pay taxes to a state or a province and build businesses and universities in that state or province are people who end up with significant power that does not depend on the national government.  They have fought for and secured separate, if not always equal, instruments of authority, and might seek prolonged dominance in the way that national leaders in the rest of the world do. Some might stay in power much longer than expected, or longer than would be possible on a national stage, yet, due to decentralization and dilution, their effect or influence on the rest of the nation remains minimal. In other words, if the citizens of Province X have let their governor stay in power so long, that doesn’t harm the inhabitants of other provinces or the nation as a whole.

Perhaps the most important means of preventing potential leaders for life in rich democracies, however, is that they have informal mechanisms to ensure that former leaders maintain a position of status and respect when they trundle out of office. This cannot be overestimated as a check on the ambitions of rulers and their accompanying cliques. This system has ways in which former leaders lose power but maintain, at the very least, self-respect. They start foundations or libraries, serve on boards, take up important causes, stay active in partisan politics, teach at universities, lobby on behalf of organizations or movements, and busy themselves in other prominent pursuits. Thanks to the internet, former leaders’ beaming countenances emanate from websites associated with all these new niches, and their Twitter and other social media presence allows them and their fans to remain engaged. Also reassuring to them is that their children and close colleagues’ children will always enjoy instant access to the corridors of power and the substantial perks and employment opportunities linked to that access.

Rich democracies are, well, richer, and their sources of power and prestige are not as concentrated.  These factors have created conditions which all but guarantee future prosperity and respect to former leaders, easing the descent from their pedestals.

Because of these simple, self-evident truths, we should not expect that rulers of most nations in the world– nations which do not have the same wealth or traditional unofficial post-leadership systems and processes– will not seek to stay in power, nor should we continue to express surprise or whine and caterwaul when they do.

Western governments and media might reconsider the charade of comments and coverage that seem to assume that most rulers have anything but power as a guiding principle. Until and unless their societies find means to create continued status and respect for them and theirs in a post-ruling scenario, it should be assumed that all they care about is staying in power. Policies, statements, and commentary should reflect this understanding even as evolution beyond this zero-sum mentality and reality is encouraged. After all, alternate current has greater range and is more useful to more people than direct current.

 

Macroeconomic Equilibrium, Social Justice, and Political Freedom in Two Easy Steps

All the nations which today have achieved the highest degree of human development and citizen satisfaction, without exception, relied and rely on two factors to get there and stay there: Freedom of expression and education of girls.

Ensure those two things in your society and just about everything else eventually takes care of itself. It really is that easy.

The Killing Floor: A Proposal for Minimum Casualty and Damage Reparations

Reparations for civilian casualties and material damage resulting from erroneous bombings or attacks by a nation’s armed forces should be—at the very least– equal to the amount of money spent on the attack. For the purposes of this short proposal, the United States’ armed forces are used as an example, but the proposal applies to any nation with a modern, well-trained, and well-equipped army.

The United States armed forces are the best in the world– and they cost a lot more than that. Ordinary citizens probably have no realistic, non- budget numbers, detailed sense of how much money the U.S. spends on its armed forces, nor would they. One way of providing a snapshot of just how much it costs the U.S. military to wage war might be to adopt a simple reparations equation: When U.S. armed forces make mistakes that lead to the death of non-combatants or the destruction of property, any reparations paid should use as a baseline—not a total– the cost of the mission that made the error.

An example would be the erroneous October 2015 attack on the Medicins sans frontieres facility in Kunduz, Afghanistan.  The baseline—not the total– reparations for the cost of rebuilding the hospital and “condolence payments” to victims should be the cost of the operation itself. How much did it cost for the transportation, munitions, equipment depreciation, targeting, communications, logistics, security, planning, salaries plus combat pay, and everything else that was required for that one mission? Once that figure is determined—which would probably, in itself, be a useful exercise—it becomes the baseline figure for any reparations. Not the upper limit, but the floor for determining payments.

The Kunduz attack was, of course, an accident, and any casualties and damage were unintended. It was also probably pretty cheap compared to most U.S. air attacks, since it appears to have involved one C-130 plane and relatively cheap munitions. Many missions involve numerous fighter/bomber jets that cost far more per hour to operate. They also often fire very expensive missiles. Missiles fired from ships or land are also extremely expensive.

Many missions are, of course, much less expensive. They might be a patrol of soldiers on foot or in a convoy of a few vehicles. Even these missions are more expensive than they might seem, however, as they, too, involve equipment, salaries, bonuses, training, munitions, planning, logistics, and many other costs.

U.S. military operations are very expensive—even those which cause unintended casualties and damage. Reparations for accidental death, casualties, and damage should at least be equal to the cost of inflicting them. Adopting this proposal would not only provide a minimum “killing floor” for compensation, but would also remind armed forces and citizenry alike just how much discretionary budget is spent on military operations.

Roll Tide: Global Jihad and/or Alabama Football

ISIS jihadists, Aryan Nations white supremacists, US Marines, Arsenal supporters, Crips and Bloods, Mafia criminals, IRA militants, and die-hard fans of the Alabama Crimson Tide might seem to have nothing or very little in common. In fact, they are all manifestations of the same universal motivation and aspiration: young men searching for meaning in life. Many young men seek enthusiasm, excitement, and action– and value being part of organizations that they perceive to be in pursuit of an honorable mission. Each of the above affiliations– and others– provides a ready-made package to address that longing. All of the above groups demand devotion, loyalty, and respect for ritual. All provide association with power, a sense of accomplishment or achievement, and the assurance that whatever members do on behalf of the organization is worthy and useful.

In the wake of a terrorist incident claiming the lives of innocent persons targeted on the basis of their ascription rather than their actions, experts and ordinary news consumers alike often give voice to a fundamental and frustrating question: Why do they do this? What makes young men (and they are, overwhelmingly, young men) shoot up sidewalk cafes, blow themselves up at military checkpoints, or behead captives? How is it that they have slipped the bonds of normal human decency?

These young men have been caught up in the romance of belonging, affiliation, loyalty, and—most importantly—the glory of being part of a movement that is doing something “important.” They have gleefully abandoned the normal, ordinary drudgery of being a student, farmer, clerk, apprentice, small-time crook, or unemployed layabout and have answered the call to join the throngs of similarly inspired young men at Emirates stadium. For these zealots, Arsenal football is the strongest motivational factor in their lives.

Or they joined the U.S. Marine Corps to shout slogans in unison as they surged through the early morning mud on a basic training run. Or they reveled in the secrecy and tradecraft of collecting money from sympathizers, and finding complicated and mysterious ways to procure random weapons here and there for the IRA. Or they showed everyone in their neighborhood who was a real player by making sure all noticed the blue bandanna tucked in their back pockets. Or they justified extortion, violence, spells in prison, and mortal sin by reassuring themselves that the cosa nostra was a respectable way to engage the world. Or they painted their faces red every Saturday to demonstrate unquestioned allegiance to the Crimson Tide, and shouted themselves red repeating the sacred mantra, “Roll Tide.”

But back to the unrelenting tide of global jihadism. Who ARE those guys and why do they do this?

They are young men motivated by the dramatic and romantic appeal of inspirational videos, identifying apparel, chants, slogans, and other rituals of belonging to a rite that reminds its adherents that they are part of a much larger mission—a mission with resonance far beyond whatever their explicit role in its realization may be. Like heroes in video games, they are on a quest, and that pursuit requires nothing short of unalloyed allegiance and commitment. They are, after all, the few, the proud, the Marines.

Or they are child soldiers in African conflicts who come to believe that belonging to a mystical and murderous rebel movement is, in the end, much easier and more fun than helping their parents with subsistence farming. Or fraternity pledges at almost any U.S. university sent out on a hazing errand.

What makes these jihadists so angry and aggrieved? How can they justify what they do in the name of revenge or self-defense?

They are men who believe that their way of life has been assailed on all sides by oppressive governments, military forces, and followers of other religions. They point to the many ways in which people they claim to represent suffer, and believe that they are both the last line of defense and the point of the spear in violent offensive confrontation with the many evil forces aligned against them and determined to wipe them out. They are the true believers– the Aryan Nations.

These groups are, of course, not the same, and, clearly, there should be no attempt to establish or condone any presumption of moral equivalence between the actions of all these groups. Trying to blow up a passenger plane in midair by igniting your underwear is worse than swatting a sedentary older guy when you drunkenly miss the high-five your fellow fanatic proffers at the game. It is worse than participating in a ground battle as part of a trained military force. It is worse than a gangland revenge killing. It is worse than adoration of a grossly overpaid coach with a history of recruiting violations and laughable player graduation statistics.

Just as clear, however, are the patterns of motivation that lead young men to follow such disparate but, in many ways, similar demands on their devotion, direction, and energy. It is not to excuse those who choose violence to point out that the motivational factors that led them to that choice might have, in another set of circumstances, steered them toward a more benign outlet for their energy, aspirations, and quest for self-esteem.

Visa or European Express?

An ancillary but groundbreaking aspect of the ongoing influx of hundreds of thousands of Middle Eastern, African, and other migrants into the EU is the sudden irrelevance of decades of European visa policies. Obscured by the spectacle of the sudden rush of arrivals is the fact that almost all of those who stream into Europe daily would have been denied visas or barred from entry had they sought to enter Europe via long-established legal means. European visa regimes have quickly been rendered largely obsolete, so European nations are, at the very least, faced with overhauling their procedures for legal entry. They will probably also have to re-imagine how they handle travelers who by tradition– and law– require visas for entry.

Consider the basic fact that all of the migrants in the current surge fit the profile of “intending immigrant”—in other words, the very travelers European visa systems were designed to prevent from setting foot on the continent. Even more of a shock to the system is that the poster boys for almost automatic denial of visas– young, unemployed, under-educated, unmarried males—are extremely well represented among the flood of migrants.

European visa policies officially consider these young men, as a demographic subset, to represent the highest category of risk to overstay tourist or other non-immigrant visas because they usually cannot prove that they have strong enough incentives to return to their country of origin or residence. Without a convincing combination of wife, children, well-paid and/or or long-term employment, or significant social/family status to bind them to their country of residence, they are routinely denied visas. It is assumed that young, untethered men without sufficient reason to return to a poorer country where they have less opportunity will choose to stay—even illegally– in a richer country with greater opportunity.

Now we are witnessing tens of thousands of these young men blithely crossing border after border of countries that would have almost certainly refused to grant them legal entry. Moreover, when interviewed by the media, these young men quite openly proclaim that their migration was motivated by desire for education, employment, and the social benefits of living in European society— exactly what European visa systems were crafted to prevent them from accessing. Almost any of the quotes we read and hear every day would have automatically disqualified the speaker as a viable visa applicant to any EU country had he said such a thing on a visa application or in an interview for a visa. What has transpired, therefore, is nothing less than the de facto crumbling—in a matter of months– of the foundation of European non-immigrant visa policies.

Political, security, demographic, and social judgements aside, it is impossible not to consider the wholesale disregard of Europe’s borders a bureaucratic nightmare of unprecedented scale. What has become of the mighty European visa system? Are European embassies’ waiting rooms still full of visa applicants, or have all former aspirants to legal entry chosen to head for Turkey, foregoing the expense, long waits, and potential humiliation of applying for visas?

Almost every migrant in the current wave also has a family that s/he hopes will be permitted to follow her/him to Europe. That, too, represents a tremendous challenge to visa regimes. Family reunification is a common goal of legal migration, and is always provided for in some way, but usually after a long wait and a lot of bureaucracy. How are European countries going to manage the family reunification expectations of hundreds of thousands who themselves bypassed existing formalities to gain their immigrant status?

What does this mean for the future of European visa regimes? Should we expect to see a wave of Asians and South Americans who have been denied a visa joining the hundreds of thousands on the migration footpath who have skipped the application process altogether? Are bureaucrats in Brussels and every European capital scrambling to come up with new visa rules? If so, will they be tougher or more lenient? Might they even be transformed into something entirely different from the traditional visa—something disruptive to local law and prevailing practice in migration?

What will probably emerge from this upheaval is, in the short- to medium-term, a significant relaxation of de facto—if not de jure– rules on overseas visa issuance by European countries. If nothing else, loosening legal means to access to Europe is more efficient and cheaper than dealing with tens or hundreds of thousands arriving illegally, en masse, and requiring immediate and sustained help. This recognition– if not embrace– of the inevitable will be accompanied by much stricter enforcement of rules for residency and benefits. We should also start to see widespread information campaigns designed to educate recent arrivals, native populations, and potential intending immigrants about asylum, refugee, immigration, and residency rules– and about the authorities’ commitment to enforcing them. This dual approach might have the effect of mitigating some of the unrealistic expectations on all sides and could buy time to develop and begin to execute a new visa and immigration system.

For the moment, however, there’s no turning the migrants back—which means there is no turning back from the immediate requirement for new and realistic European non-immigrant visa policies.