In most countries, the primary occupation and preoccupation of the leader is staying in power. Although international political and diplomatic discourse—and much media reporting– is predicated on the notion that rulers act on the basis of law, for the good of their nations, or with a strategic interest in some defined long-term benefit, rulers’ actions consistently prove these presumptions wrong. It is a strain of myopia to believe or pretend that most rulers in the world care about anything but continuing to rule.
Government officials and pundits in rich democracies often express surprise, disappointment, or even hurt feelings when, to use one common example, the ruler of a country that is not a rich democracy makes clear that, despite the laws or constitution that prohibit staying in office beyond his current mandate, he does not plan to leave his post. (NB: Because the overwhelming majority of such rulers are men, this article will depart from standard usage and use masculine pronouns.) Observers and international partners may also evince naive astonishment or shock when he uses his office for personal financial gain, to create opportunities for relatives or friends, or to menace and/or harm anyone who challenges his grip on power.
Yet this behavior is, of course, to be expected; it is the modus operandi in the overwhelming majority of countries. Most world leaders’ governing goals or principles amount to nothing more than remaining in power as long as possible. This is human nature, but these men’s obsession with occupying the top spot is, in general, also prudent and reasonable behavior. After all, most nations’ political systems and societies do not offer former leaders roles or niches that provide financial security, worthy outlets for their experience and energy, and– perhaps most important—the honor and respect they believe they have earned. Most rulers are thus– quite understandably— comfortable where they are and determined to stay there.
The importance the ruler places on remaining in office over any other priority is sometimes demonstrated by actions that twist or abandon his prior goals or aspirations. On many occasions, a country’s leader does something counterintuitive or unorthodox that momentarily astounds precisely because it doesn’t seem to fit a narrative or context that had defined his previously expressed identity or deliberate actions. (Former Yemeni president Saleh’s alliance with the Houthis is a good example.) Every single time this kind of thing happens, the leader is making the unusual decision or taking the unexpected step for the simple reason that he believes it’s good for him. He is never loyal to a party, ideology, set of laws, current allies, or his people. He is certainly not to be constrained by commonly-understood concepts of right and wrong. What is right is remaining in power. That’s all there is to it.
Examples of this abound. Scan the international news any day to find reminders or new occurrences of the by-now-standard artifices even elected leaders employ to remain in office. Just a few of the more common tactics are constitutional changes to allow extra terms in office, sliding into the office of prime minister from the presidency (or vice-versa) with attendant shifts of duties from the old office to the new, sudden alliances with former political enemies to maintain or retake power, and imposition by decree of “temporary emergency” measures which delay political processes and—literally—handcuff the opposition.
Yet the international community quite often pretends that these rulers and their systems of government stand for something other than holding onto power. Governments, media, and knowledgeable observers often express something like dismay when these leaders “forget,” ‘’neglect,” “fail to respect,” or even “betray” some presumably universal ideal. They aren’t. They have one ideal, and they admire it in the mirror. That is the fairest representation of all ideologies, policies, or philosophies.
And none of this should be a surprise, since the factors that help generate these realities are usually related to size and scale. Most countries in the world offer much less to exploit and much less to control than large developed democracies, so leaders’ ability to control and exploit what’s available in most countries is easily and quickly magnified. Even without resorting to violent oppression, there are many subtle but effective ways for a leader to ensure that his writ runs far and wide. (For the purposes of this essay, the leader’s effective control of security forces is assumed.)
Establishing control of a small country’s few banks or sources of credit creates stifling economic and political power. If one main port and airport serve the country, seizing the administration of those utilities confers significant leverage that translates into commercial, security, and fiscal advantages. Relatively new but increasingly important slices of power that most leaders hasten to carve out for themselves are cell phone networks, TV stations, and soccer/football teams (the latter being the true religion or faith of the majority of males in most countries). If a political leader gains enough influence—directly or through proxies—of these components of national economic and social identity, everyone else who matters will in some way come to depend on that leader. And that leader will have no incentive or impetus to relinquish his position.
Second, while all societies and countries have at least some diffuse elements of traditional power, most formal political systems are quite centralized—certainly compared to the example of the United States. In most countries, being the ruler means controlling the capital city; in most countries the capital city controls almost everything else. In contrast, the governor of any given U.S. state arguably has greater authority over the day-to-day lives of that state’s citizens than the U.S. president or Congress do. The local county or municipality government might even have more influence over Americans’ quotidian activities than their state government. It is thus difficult to establish a great deal of political control over the American population. Yet, in most countries, the national government controls the university system, owns and operates public utilities, and runs at least some TV networks and other media. Even many sports teams are sponsored by the police or army or some other state or parastatal institution. Consolidating control over a centralized system offers exponentially more power to a ruler than he might aspire to in a federal or less centralized political landscape. This scenario, of course, also underscores the role of the national leader and makes it that much more difficult to dislodge him or those close to him.
Related to this, in countries that once had regional or local sources of political power—perhaps through elected governors, for example—it is not uncommon to see a leader seek new ways to eliminate those poles of authority. A tried and true method is engineering the transition—usually with a façade of legality—from a system of elected governors and/or municipal chiefs to a system in which those subnational officials are appointed by the ruler himself. A ruler who successfully appoints regional authorities can also usually command the loyalty of those political and economic agents who depend on those regional authorities. They, too, are now tied to the ruler through their superior/ benefactor and would likely be replaced should the ruler pick someone else. In a small economy, this type of expanded web of patronage extends as far as school principals, factory shift bosses, the heads of local radio stations, and many other positions of relatively small-scale authority.
Most nations are, therefore, ruled by someone—regardless of how he came to power—who has amassed most of the levers of power and jealously keeps them at his disposal. The national budget, access to credit, opportunities for employment or contracts, identification with elements of national identity (sports teams, for example) are just some of the arrows in the quiver of authority controlled or strongly influenced by one person and his close entourage.
While in office, of course, a leader’s primary activity is to employ the prerogatives of power to favor and enrich himself and those who are close to him. Everyone in the country he governs understands this in the same way that he does. Sometimes, Western governments and media appear to be the only ones who don’t appear to grasp this basic concept.
In the end, however, the leader’s abiding aspiration is rarely just financial gain. It is perhaps more important that the leader also corner the market on honor and respect. Due to his many tentacles and influence, respecting and deferring to him as a matter of course is not only judicious, but likely inevitable. Over time, however, admiration and respect for him might be genuine– and earned. After all, the media the leader controls extol his proclaimed authorship of any measurable progress or glory and highlight his shining participation in almost every event of importance to and in the country. Over time, the leader becomes so closely identified with the nation that he begins to believe that he is the primary ingredient in anything of note that occurs in the country.
In this context, what is a leader to do when her or his time is up? At a certain point, it becomes inconceivable to him to leave power. Why should he? He rationalizes that nothing would work properly without him. Surely, the people have become dependent on his dedication, effort, and very persona, he imagines. Worse, what if someone else controlled all these tools of power he has worked so hard to amass and guard? In short: What would happen to him and to those he cares about—to say nothing of the many who owe their fortunes and lot in life to their association with him? This is too grim a prospect to imagine, so there is no point in entertaining the notion of leaving power.
Of course, the desire to remain in office is fairly universal. Even in rich, large democracies many leaders value their own power above all else. Why would someone seek public office, after all, if s/he didn’t believe s/he was better than the alternatives? If s/he is better, why should s/he leave? There is no shortage of Western politicians who stay as long as they can and muse about staying longer when they eventually, grudgingly, give up their office.
However, several traditional factors in rich democracies mitigate the worst instincts of their leaders to remain in power indefinitely, and some of them do not depend on the rule of law or a functioning system of separation of powers.
First, the sheer size of the U.S. and a few other large countries is complemented by a resultant decentralization of political and economic power. People who pay taxes to a state or a province and build businesses and universities in that state or province are people who end up with significant power that does not depend on the national government. They have fought for and secured separate, if not always equal, instruments of authority, and might seek prolonged dominance in the way that national leaders in the rest of the world do. Some might stay in power much longer than expected, or longer than would be possible on a national stage, yet, due to decentralization and dilution, their effect or influence on the rest of the nation remains minimal. In other words, if the citizens of Province X have let their governor stay in power so long, that doesn’t harm the inhabitants of other provinces or the nation as a whole.
Perhaps the most important means of preventing potential leaders for life in rich democracies, however, is that they have informal mechanisms to ensure that former leaders maintain a position of status and respect when they trundle out of office. This cannot be overestimated as a check on the ambitions of rulers and their accompanying cliques. This system has ways in which former leaders lose power but maintain, at the very least, self-respect. They start foundations or libraries, serve on boards, take up important causes, stay active in partisan politics, teach at universities, lobby on behalf of organizations or movements, and busy themselves in other prominent pursuits. Thanks to the internet, former leaders’ beaming countenances emanate from websites associated with all these new niches, and their Twitter and other social media presence allows them and their fans to remain engaged. Also reassuring to them is that their children and close colleagues’ children will always enjoy instant access to the corridors of power and the substantial perks and employment opportunities linked to that access.
Rich democracies are, well, richer, and their sources of power and prestige are not as concentrated. These factors have created conditions which all but guarantee future prosperity and respect to former leaders, easing the descent from their pedestals.
Because of these simple, self-evident truths, we should not expect that rulers of most nations in the world– nations which do not have the same wealth or traditional unofficial post-leadership systems and processes– will not seek to stay in power, nor should we continue to express surprise or whine and caterwaul when they do.
Western governments and media might reconsider the charade of comments and coverage that seem to assume that most rulers have anything but power as a guiding principle. Until and unless their societies find means to create continued status and respect for them and theirs in a post-ruling scenario, it should be assumed that all they care about is staying in power. Policies, statements, and commentary should reflect this understanding even as evolution beyond this zero-sum mentality and reality is encouraged. After all, alternate current has greater range and is more useful to more people than direct current.